

原著論文

Language and the Inhuman: A Linguistic Approach to George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

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We come after. We know now that a man can read Goethe or Rilke in the evening, that he can play Bach and Schubert, and go to his day's work at Auschwitz in the morning. To say that he has read them without understanding or that his ear is gross, is cant. In what ways does this knowledge bear on literature and society, on the hope, grown almost axiomatic from the time of Plato to that of Matthew Arnold, that culture is a humanizing force, that the energies of spirit are transferable to those of conduct? Moreover, it is not only the case that the established media of civilization – the universities, the arts, the book world – failed to offer adequate resistance to political bestiality; they often rose to welcome it and give it ceremony and apologia. Why? What are the links, as yet scarcely understood, between the mental, psychological habits of high literacy and the temptations of the inhuman?¹

'Even evil and madness show a stunted intelligence'.²

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Introduction: What does this essay scrutinize?

In his essay *Language and Silence* (1958), George Steiner remarked:

De Maistre and George Orwell have written of the politics of language, of how the word may lose its *humane meanings* under the pressure of political bestiality and falsehood. We have scarcely begun, as yet, to apply their insights to the actual history of language and feeling. Here almost everything remains to be done.³

Through this essay, especially focusing on the linguistic investigations of George Orwell's later work *Nineteen Eighty-Four*,⁴ I will therefore attempt to make a response to Steiner's enquiry: how the word (language) may lose its *humane meanings* – such as the word filled with 'sympathy with and consideration for the needs and distresses of others' and 'feeling or showing compassion and tenderness towards the same human beings'⁵ – under the totalitarian state, where political bestiality and falsehood are ordinary.

Any political bestiality and falsehood are, in the words of St. Augustine (354 – 430), based on *a perversion of the will* (perverse voluntas),⁶ ill-intentioned abuse of human

intellect and reasoning. Viewed from literary history, this has been in remarkable ways mentioned by great intellectual figures: Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.), Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) and Dante (1265-1321). Above all, Dante, whose intellectual heritage was deeply in debt to Aristotle's *Politics* 1253a31,⁷ and Aquinas' *Expositio in Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, VII, lect., 6, n. 1403,⁸ conveyed how ill-intentioned abuse of human intellect and reasoning causes grave evil upon human beings. We see this in his masterpiece, *Commedia (The Divine Comedy)*, *Inferno*, Canto XXXI: 55-57:

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999.

⁷ *Sicut homo, si sit perfectus virtute, est optimus animalium, sic si sit separatus a lege et iustitia, pessimus omnium, cum homo habeat arma rationis* (Just as a man, if he is advanced in virtue, is the noblest of all animals, so if he departs from the path of justice, he is the most dangerous of all, since he is armed with reason [Singleton C. S. (1989) *The Divine Comedy, Inferno*, 2: Commentary, Princeton University Press, p. 568.]). [*sicut*: Adv. just as] [*si*: a conditional particle. if, when + *sit* <sum in the form of conjunctive mood] [*optimus*: Adj. superlative. of the best, of the noblest + *animalium*: N. pl. animals] [*sic*: Adv. so] [*sit separatus*: be separated + *a*: Prep. from with ablative] [*lege* <lex. N. law + et: Conj. and + *iustitia*: N. justice] [*pessimus*: Adj. superlative. [*malus* + *omnium* <ominis. Adj. genitive] [*cum*: Conj. because, for + *habeat* < *habeo*: subjunctive mood]

⁸ *Unus homo malus decies millies potest mala facere quam bestia, propter rationem quam habet ad excogitandum diversa mala* (An evil man can do ten thousand times more harm than a beast by his reason which he can use to devise very diverse evils. [C. S. (1989). *The Divine Comedy, Inferno*, 2: Commentary, p. 569]). [*unus*: Adj. one + *homo* + *malus*: Adj. evil] [*decies*: Adv. ten times + *millies* < *mille*. Adj. plural. a thousand] [*potest mala facere*: can do mala <malum N. accusative. evil things] [*quam*: Adv. + comparative: more ~ than + *bestia*: N. beast, animal] [*propter*: Prep. by means of + *rationem* (acc.) = by means of reason] [*quam*: Relative Pron. acc.] [*habet ad excogitandum*: *habet ad* + acc.] [*excogitandum*: gerund (doing + *diversa mala*: pl. diverse) = invent (something new) diverse evils]

¹ Steiner G. (1967) *Language and Silence: Essays 1958-1966*. Faber and Faber: London, preface, pp. 14-15.

² Wiesel E. (1982) *The Town beyond the Wall*. New York: Schocken Books. p. 151.

³ op. cit., Steiner G. (1967), p. 118.

⁴ Orwell G. (2000) *Nineteen Eighty-Four* [Penguin Student Edition]. Penguin Books: London.

⁵ OED: *Oxford English Dictionary*. 2009, 2nd edition on CD-ROM, v. 4.0, Oxford University Press.

⁶ St. Augustine. *Confessions*. tr. by Henry Chadwick, Oxford University Press, 1998Book VII, Chapter 3: 5, 16:22; The Loeb Classical Library.

s'aggiugne al mal volere a la possa,

[*possa* <potenza: N. power= violenza (violence)]

nessunt riparo vi puo far la gente.

[*nessunt*: pron. no-one, nobody] [*riparo* <riparare: V. to protect, to shield] [*riparare* + *vi*: personal pron: to protect oneself] [*puo*: V. indicate mood, present, the 3rd person singular of *potere*: can, to be able to] [*fare*: V. to do] [*la*: Art]

l'argomento de la mente s'aggiugne al mal volere a la possa,

[*la*: Art. the + *argomento*: N. argument, reasoning, inference] [*de*: Prep. of] [*la*: Art + *mente*: N. mind, intellect (*mente* = *intelligenza*, *memoria*)] [*sa* (passive voice) + *aggiungere*: V. to join, to add = *s'aggiugne* (to be added to, to be joined)] [*al* = *a* (Prep): to + *il* (Art)] [*mal*: N. evil] [*volere*: N. will] [*a*: Prep] [*la*: art] [*possa* <potenza: N. power= violenza (violence)]

*nessunt riparo vi puo far la gente.*⁹

[*nessunt*: pron. no-one, nobody] [*riparo* <riparare: V. to protect, to shield] [*riparare* + *vi*: personal pron: to protect oneself] [*puo*: V. indicate mood, present, the 3rd person singular of *potere*: can, to be able to] [*fare*: V. to do] [*la*: Art] [*gente*: N. people]

[For, where the argument of *reason* is¹⁰/ for where the instrument of *mind* is¹¹

Joined with an evil will and potency,¹²/ added to an evil will and to great power,¹³

There is no possible defence for man (human)¹⁴/ men (humans) can make no defense against it.¹⁵]

I. Where the argument of *reason* is joined with an evil will and potency, there is no possible defence for man (human).

I-1. Syntactic and semantic analyses of the three major Party slogans

Through *Oceania*, a totalitarian dystopia which is under the control of *Ingsoc* (English Socialism) in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, we can see how political bestiality and falsehood based on ill-intentioned abuse of human intellect and reasoning become immensely powerful, particularly focusing on the deliberate falsification of language.

There are three Party slogans advocated by *Oceania*:¹⁶

(1) WAR IS PEACE.

(2) FREEDOM IS SLAVERY.

(3) IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH.

In the third Party slogan, IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH, which must be derived from *Scientia est potentia* and is generally attributed to Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the word IGNORANCE seems to have three possible meanings: (a) the lack of knowledge, (b) the lack of education and (c) the lack of awareness.

The prototype of syntactic structure that is common to the three major Party slogans is:

[S[NP[N]N]NP[VP[V]V[NP[N]N]NP]VP]S].

Each major Party slogan therefore can be described as follows:

(1) [S[NP[N^{war}]N]NP[VP[V^{is}]V[NP[N^{peace}]N]NP]VP]S].

(2) [S[NP[N^{freedom}]N]NP[VP[V^{is}]V[NP[N^{slavery}]N]NP]VP]S].

(3) [S[NP[N^{ignorance}]N]NP[VP[V^{is}]V[NP[N^{strength}]N]NP]VP]S].

Syntactic analyses of (1)~(3) show that NP[N^{war}] and NP[N^{peace}] in (1), NP[N^{freedom}] and NP[N^{slavery}] in (2), and NP[N^{ignorance}] and NP[N^{strength}] in (3) are syntactically all in apposition, whereas NP[N^{war}] is not the synonym of NP[N^{peace}]; NP[N^{freedom}], not the synonym of NP[N^{slavery}]; and NP[N^{ignorance}], not the synonym of NP[N^{strength}]. Or, we can paraphrase (1) - (3) as follows: NP[N^{peace}] is not a property of NP[N^{war}]; NP[N^{slavery}], not a property of NP[N^{freedom}]; and [N^{strength}] not a property of NP[N^{ignorance}].

Semantic analyses of the three Party slogans, (1) - (3) reveal the nature of their political implications. Suppose NP[N^{peace}] stands for *p*, then NP[N^{war}] will be described as $\neg p$. The syntactical structure of [S[NP[N^{war}]N]NP[VP[V^{is}]V[NP[N^{peace}]N]NP]VP]S] shows that *p* and $\neg p$ are in apposition; thereby we can describe its syntactical relationship as follows: $p \equiv \neg p$. It is however not the case that $p \equiv \neg p$ is true.

The first Party slogan WAR IS PEACE is therefore syntactically permissible but semantically *nonsense* because, truth-conditionally, it is quite hard to imagine what the world would have to be like for this sentence to be true. Considering this, it will be quite evident that the remaining two Party slogans are also *nonsense*. Thus nonsense lies at

be found in part II, ix, 26f.

⁹ Dante A. *The Divine Comedy, Inferno*, Canto XXXI: 55-57. tr. by Singleton C. S., Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 330-331.

¹⁰ Dante A. *The Divine Comedy, Inferno*, Canto XXXI: 55. tr. by Sisson C. H., Oxford World's Classic: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 178.

¹¹ op. cit., Singleton C. S. (1980), Canto XXXI: 55.

¹² op. cit., Sisson C. H. (1998), Canto XXXI: 56.

¹³ op. cit., Singleton C. S. (1980), Canto XXXI: 56.

¹⁴ op. cit., Sisson C. H. (1998), Canto XXXI: 57.

¹⁵ op. cit., Singleton C. S. (1980), Canto XXXI: 57.

¹⁶ More detailed political message installed in the three Party slogans can

the very core of the three Party slogans.

I-2. The characteristics of *Newspeak*, the language designed for political control

The socio-political system of *Ingsoc* is a dystopia where language was gradually being diminished by transforming *Oldspeak* (traditional English language) into *Newspeak*, an artificially invented language which was designed for 'narrowing the range of thought' (I, 49: 15-16, II, ix, 188: 30-31, Appendix, 271:12-13) focusing on the fact that 'thought is dependent on words' (Appendix, 270:23).¹⁷ Narrowing the range of thought depends on narrowing the usage of language. Narrowing the usage of language means to restrict the freedom of thinking that is the very sign of being human. Therefore if we are daily forced to use our language wrongly under the oppression and tyranny of a totalitarian state such as *Ingsoc*, it will be very likely that we conceive wrongly of everything and twist the sense of common humanity.

The political aims of *Newspeak* are: (1) to provide a medium of expression for the world-view of *Ingsoc*; (2) to provide mental habits proper to the devotees of *Ingsoc*; and (3) eventually to make all other modes of thought impossible (Appendix, 270: 17-19). To achieve those political purposes, *Ingsoc* attempts to transform *Oldspeak* into *Newspeak* mainly consisting of *A*, *B* and *C* vocabularies (cf. The Grammar Table of *Newspeak*).

The *A* vocabulary consisted of words needed for the business of everyday life, such as eating, drinking, working, putting on one's clothes, going upstairs and downstairs, riding in vehicles, gardening, cooking; the *B* vocabulary, which was constructed for political purposes, consisted of two - or three - syllabled words and extremely shortened compound words (Appendix, 274: 11); and the *C* vocabulary, following the same grammatical rules as the words in *A* and *B* vocabularies, consisted of *entirely scientific and technical terms* that are rigidly defined to strip them of undesirable meanings. (Appendix, 279:8-9; 11-13, cf. 276:20-21).

I-3. Reification in language that accelerates dehumanization

¹⁷ This aspect of language totally agrees with Wittgenstein's later philosophical position: 'We think in language, and the language is itself the vehicle of thought' [Wittgenstein L. (2005.^{3rd}) *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, part I., 329].

In Oceania, even human language headed straight for *reification* (depersonalization),¹⁸ and the reified language (the language depersonalized) became more dominant than the language of *mind* and had a key-role in maintaining strict thought control, thereby accelerating the process of words losing their humane meanings.

One of the remarkable linguistic characteristics of *Newspeak* is that it is very similar to the language of science (cf. the *C* vocabulary in *Newspeak Dictionary*) whose general characteristics are: (a) impersonality; (b) moral neutrality and lack of self-involvement; (c) not the expression of emotions that can be neither true nor false; (d) and the priority of univocal usage of words/ terms to avoid conceptual ambiguities.

Taking the case of (a), a human is considered as an impersonal/ inanimate object in *Newspeak*. For example, as *A* vocabulary shows, *think* and *knife* are grammatically categorised as the same *Noun-Verbs*, in which we can see no clear distinction between *think*, which exemplifies the language of mind, and *knife* the language of things objectively considered. Taking (b) and (c), the language of science exemplifying reified language is morally neutral and not self-involving, and therefore 'cannot judge Roosevelt to be superior to Stalin'.¹⁹ This means that 'real science does not talk about good and bad'.²⁰ The case of (d) can be typically seen in the ways of composing words in *Newspeak* to exclude their conceptual ambiguities, eventually making all other modes of thought impossible (cf. Table 1 and 2). Thus the more *Newspeak* is used, the more *reification* in language becomes dominant in everyday life. And there is no doubt that the dominance of reified language, as typified by *A-C Vocabularies*,²¹ in everyday life accelerates the

¹⁸ op. cit., *OED* (2009).

¹⁹ Bloom A. (1987) *The Closing of the American Mind*. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 297.

²⁰ op. cit., Bloom (1987), p. 363.

²¹ The main body of *Newspeak*, particularly *A-C Vocabularies* seems to be taken from *A Voyage to Laputa* in Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*. One of the characteristics of the language people use in the kingdom of *Laputa* is in 'their Phraseology (phrasing: ways of speaking and writing), which depends much upon Science and Musick... Their Ideas are perpetually conversant in Lines and Figures. *Imagination, Fancy, and Invention, they are wholly Strangers to, nor have any Words in their Language by which those Ideas can be expressed*; the whole Compass of their Thoughts and Minds, being shut up within the two forementioned Sciences (Science and Musick)' [Swift J. (2008^{Rep.}) *Gulliver's Travels*. Oxford World's Classics: Oxford Univ. pp. 149-150]. At the School of Languages which Gulliver visited, three professors were 'in Consultation upon improving that of their own Country: The first Project was to shorten Discourse by cutting *Polysyllables* into *one*, and leaving out Verbs and Participles; because in Reality all things imaginable are but *Nouns*. The other, was a Scheme for entirely abolishing all Words whatsoever...' [ibid, pp. 172-173, Explanatory Notes, p. 331]. An Expedient was therefore offered, that *since Words are only Names for Things*, it would be more convenient for all Men to carry about them, such *Things* as were necessary to express the particular Business they are to discourse on. ... Another great Advantage proposed by this Invention (Improvement of the Language In *Laputa*), was, that it would serve as an universal Language to be understood in all civilized Nations,

degeneration of our speculative intellectual activities, particularly the faculty of thinking and creative imagination that form the quality of our being human. *Newspeak*, whose very core is formed by the language of *things* and *science*, therefore functions as a linguistic tool that makes humans inhuman and accelerates the process of words losing their humane meanings.

I-4. Linguistic structures of reified language

How does objective language/ the language of *things* and *science* become more dominant than the language of *mind* in *Newspeak*? In *Newspeak*, there is no word to express *political freedom*, *intellectual freedom* and *human freedom*, since they 'no longer existed even as concepts, and were therefore of necessity nameless' (Appendix, 271: 4-9). These words associated with speculation such as *thought* also no longer existed in *Newspeak* (Appendix, 272: 12-13).

The word *free* (Adj) also no longer has the meaning it used to have, such as 'acting of one's own will or choice, and not under compulsion or constraint; determining one's own action or choice, not motivated from without.'²² Sentences such as *This dog is free from lice* and *This field is free from weeds* (Appendix, 271: 9-15) describe nothing but the relationship of two objects/ things: the former shows the relationship between two things, *dog* and *lice* (free (the_dog, louse)) and the latter the relationship between *field* and *weed* (free (field, weed)). Any elements concerning political and intellectual freedom are totally expelled from *Newspeak*.

Further, the invention of extremely shortened compound *Noun-Verbs*, whose linguistic nature is to *objectify/ materialize/ concretize* anything, limit to an extreme degree people's freedom of thinking and make all other modes of thought impossible.²³

This linguistic condition can be further verifiable, if it is considered how the word (language) may lose its *humane meanings* under the inhuman totalitarianism. It has been linguistically found that, under the Nazi dictatorship, the grammatical construction of the German language was also transformed: for example, *dem soldatem Waffen geben* (to give/ hand weapons to the soldier) whose syntactic structure, [VP[V^{give}]V[NP[N^{weapons}]N[PP[P^{to}]P[NP[art

the]art[N^{soldier}]N]VP], shows the relationship between *person* ([N^{soldier}]) and *thing* ([N^{weapons}]) deteriorated into the inhuman phrasing *dem soldatem bewafferen* (the armed soldier: [NP[art^{the}] [A^{armed}][N^{soldier}]]) in which *soldier* (person) and *weapon* (thing) are described as the totally unified entity. This, according to Tanaka,²⁴ is a typical linguistic example that depicts how *human persons* were depersonalized or treated as *things* under the Nazi dictatorship.

II. How *Newspeak* dehumanizes human beings

II-1. What semantic and ontological analyses of *doublethink* reveal

Doublethink, an ill-intentional abuse of human intellect or reason by Party members - as represented by O'Brien, an intellectual person without any heart - cleverly drives people away into *nonsense* or *meaninglessness* because we cannot imagine what the world would have to be like for the stated things to be true. For those who practice *doublethink*, it is no longer the case that *Voces significant res* (Words signify something)²⁵ but *Voces non significant res* (Words do not signify anything). Therefore, epistemologically, we can know nothing through practicing *doublethink*. This can be verified through the analysis of the *finger words* O'Brien used in order to show Winston the actual way of *doublethink*:

O'Brien held up his left hand, its back towards Winston, with the thumb hidden and four fingers extended.

'How many fingers am I holding up, Winston?'

'Four.'...[O'Brien constantly tortured Winston.] ...

'Sometimes, Winston. Sometimes they are five. Sometimes they are three. Sometimes they are all of them at once. You must try harder. It is not easy to become sane' (III, ii, 226: 13 – 227: 19).

Ontologically, the one who practices *doublethink* cannot exist as a human being in an authentic sense: no one can set up his or her existence as a human being on nonsense. Practicing *doublethink*, what he or she actually does is to 'establish a hole of oblivion into which all [of his/ her] deeds, good and evil, would disappear,'²⁶ eventually falling into the abyss of *nothingness* (cf. III. ii. 232: 17). *Doublethink* therefore simply ruins the human mind and depersonalizes humans (cf. III, iii, 241:20-22, III, ii, 231: 5-9).

whose Goods and Utensils are generally of the same kind, or merely resembling, so that their Uses might easily be comprehended. And thus, Embassadors would be qualified to treat with foreign Princes or Ministers of State, to whose Tongues they were utter Strangers [ibid, p. 173, Explanatory Notes, p. 331.] (*All italics are mine.*)

²² op. cit., OED (2009).

²³ See the grammatical table of *Newspeak Dictionary* (Appendix 1)

²⁴ Tanaka K. (2000) *Stalin Gengogaku*. Iwanami Shoten: Tokyo, pp. 147-8.

²⁵ Aquinas T. (1978) *Summa Theologiae*, Marietti: Romae, I, q. 1, art. 10., resp.

²⁶ Arendt H. (2006) *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. London: Penguin Books. p. 232. Words and phrases in brackets are modified versions of the original text.

At the end of *Nineteen-Eighty-Four*, Winston, who was completely subjected to the program of brainwashing stuffed full of nonsense, grumbles to himself:

2 + 2 = 5 [Two plus two makes five.] (III, vi, 262: 15).

II-2. *Doublethink* in historical and political contexts

Doublethink [a clever tricking way of ‘reality control’ in *Oldspeak*] is ‘the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them’ (II, ix, 193:15-16; I, iii, 34: 13-31; II, ix., 195:29-31).

The ways of practicing *doublethink* are: (1) to know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies; (2) to cast off morality while laying claim to it; (3) to believe that democracy was impossible and the Party was the guardian of democracy; and (4) to forget what it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again (I, iii, 34: 17-26).

Doublethink thus ‘uses logic against logic’ (I, iii, 34: 20-21). Suppose *Q* stands for *Party members named Jones, Aaronson and Rutherford who existed* (cf. III, ii, 223:26-27) and then *doublethinkers* are supposed to believe that $Q \wedge \neg Q$ is true. Thus *doublethink* that ‘uses logic against logic’ (I, iii, 34: 20-21) finally resolves itself into *nonsense*. This means that *doublethink* is semantically impossible.

Is *doublethink* simply a fictional matter? No. Politicians frequently employ this tricky and nonsensical argument in many actual political scenes. For example, though it is true that Japanese soldiers killed a lot of innocent Chinese people during World War II, historical revisionist politicians, despite knowing the historical fact, declare in public that they do not believe it or do not admit that is true. This can be semantically described as $\neg \exists (\text{true}(x) \wedge \text{believe}(\text{politician}, x))$. [x is a historical fact that Japanese soldiers killed a lot of innocent Chinese people during World War II and politicians know x is true, and at the same time they do not officially state x is true.]

Quite an interesting case of *doublethink* very lately practiced was by Choe Ryon-hae, North Korea’s dictator Kim’s main military aide. In an official speech he stated:

Reality shows if peace is sought, there must be preparation for war.²⁷

What Choe stated puzzles us. In saying ‘Reality shows’, what did he mean and what did he really want to denote? There seem to be four possible ways to interpret his statement:

(i) *Reality shows if we seek peace, we must prepare for war*, which is semantically equivalent to *Reality shows if we seek peace, it is necessary that we prepare for war*. This is evidently not true in every possible situation, since it can be meaningfully translated into *As reality shows, if we seek peace, we must not prepare for war*. This means that what Choe stated is not a necessary truth.

(ii) Choe simply wanted to state: *Seeking peace is preparing for war*. Considering the lexical meaning of the words *war* (a state of armed conflict between different countries) and *peace* (a state in which there is no war), it becomes obvious that his statement is self-contradictory. In other words, *Seeking the state in which there is no war is to prepare for the state of armed conflict between different countries*.

(iii) *Reality shows if we seek peace, we must prepare for war* is a case where ‘if’ should definitely not be translated by material implication (\rightarrow) but can be translated as the conjunction of two statements *We seek peace* and *we prepare for war* whose predicate-argument formula is [seek (we, peace) \wedge prepare (we, war)]. This formula is true only if both ‘seek (we, peace)’ and ‘prepare (we, war)’ are true. However, in the context of (ii), there can be no such case.

(iv) In relation to (iii), there is a possibility that *Reality shows if we seek peace, we must prepare for war* is considered to be a logically equivalent statement. Suppose *p* stands for the proposition *We seek peace*, and *q* for the proposition *We prepare for war*. If Choe’s intention agrees with that, the logical formula of his statement must be $p \equiv q / (p \rightarrow q) \wedge (q \rightarrow p)$. In this case, *p* is a necessary and sufficient condition for *q* and *q* a necessary and sufficient condition for *p*. However, it is not the case that *p* if and only if *q*. That is, it is not the case that *We seek peace if and only if we must prepare for war* (*If we seek peace then we must prepare for war and If we must prepare for war then we seek peace* are not true at the same time).

Choe’s political statement is thus full of absurdities and self-contradictory and, as I pointed out in the syntactic and semantic structures of the three Party slogans, it also seems to be deeply affected by *doublethink* which will eventually lead us to absolute nonsense; after all, epistemologically, we can know nothing through the practice of *doublethink*.

II-3. *If-conditionals* that reveal the truth about *doublethink*

²⁷ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/27>

In the final process of indoctrinating Winston into the ways of what the Party believes, O'Brien says:

We control matter because we control mind. Reality is inside the skull. You will learn by degrees, Winston. There is nothing that we could not do. Invisibility, levitation – anything. *I could float off this floor like a soap bubble if I wished to.* I do not wish to, because the Party does not wish it. You must get rid of those nineteenth-century ideas about the laws of Nature. We make the laws of Nature.' (III, iii, 239:30-36)

Here, it is worth noting that the if-conditional statement,

I could float off this floor like a soap bubble if I wished to (III, iii, 239: 33-34)

is deeply affected by the Cartesian's dream, that is, the soul/spirit (the vital principle, related to *mind* in the modern conception) exists as distinct from the body/ matter.²⁸ This will be substantiated by his declarations: 'reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else' (III, ii, 225: 35-36); 'reality is in inside the skull' (III, iii, 239: 30); and 'nothing exists except through human consciousness' (III, iii, 240:10).

Semantically, we cannot imagine any set of possible worlds in which *I could float off this floor like a soap bubble if I wished to* can be true. That is, O'Brien wishes for *This floor floats off like a soap bubble* to be true that is not true. The if-conditional statement, *I could float off this floor like a soap bubble if I wished to*, can be therefore considered a version of doublethink.

III. In the beginning, there was a deluded political conviction: A semantic analysis of O'Brien's political statements/ convictions

Among O'Brien's political convictions,

'Whatever the Party holds to be truth, *is* truth' (III, ii, 226, 3)

must be the most trickiest instance, and seems to be open to the following interpretations:

(1) 'Whatever the Party holds to be truth, *is* truth' is nothing but a tautological statement whose truth-value is always true. This means that O'Brien's statement, say *p*, consists of an unnecessary repetition, that is, *p* is *p* that is eventually attributed to *p*.

(2) 'Whatever the Party holds to be truth, *is* truth' can be semantically rendered into the following universally quantified predicate-argument formula:

$\forall x ((x \text{ is a thing} \wedge \text{the party holds } x \text{ to be truth}) \rightarrow x \text{ is truth})$ [For all/ every *x*, if the Party holds *x* to be truth, then *x* is truth.]

However, '*x* is a thing \wedge the party holds *x* is to be truth', that is the *reason* for stating '*x* is truth', seems to be very tricky. Through making a further analysis of the inferential structure of this predicate-argument formula, we will be able to depict how O'Brien manipulated Winston to the extent of inducing him to agree with his political conviction.

R¹ [Reason¹]: Everything that is held by the Party is truth;

R² [Reason²]: There is *x* that is held by the Party;

C [Conclusion]: *x* is therefore truth.

This means that *If R¹ implies R², and R¹ is considered to be true, then C is true.* Or, if the premises, R¹ and R² of his conviction happen to be true, the conclusion, C must also be true. R¹ in his argument is the fundamental proposition through which he sees, examines and interprets anything.

Viewed from pragmatics, O'Brien, in alleging his political conviction *Everything that is held by the Party is truth*, declared that he has a self-annihilating or selfless faith in the Party's *infallibility*, that is, the Party 'can never admit an error'.²⁹ He and the Party are an undivided whole. In that sense, it is clear that his political conviction was not due to his own free will, since 'the individual only has power in so far as he ceases to be an individual' (III, iii, 239: 11-12).

It is not hard to imagine that O'Brien, who knew that logical truths can be true independently of *what the world is like* or *factual truth*, used the above-mentioned argument in a tricky and clever way. Under the pressure of political bestiality and falsehood, *sophism goes unchallenged*: the use of language, reasoning, and a logical way of thinking are 'carefully contrived to deceive and camouflage'.³⁰ O'Brien's political conviction, which is in the form of logical argument, therefore produces *total chaos* and eventually destroys all force of argument.

I therefore conclude that in saying 'Whatever the Party holds to be truth, *is* truth', O'Brien seems to have performed two things:

(i) He simply declared his political conviction in the form

²⁸ Descartes R. *Discourse on the Method*, IV, 28-49 in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. I., tr. By Cottingham J. et. Al., Cambridge University Press, 1985.

²⁹ Arendt. H. (1985) *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. A Harvest Book: New York and London, part III, p. 349.

³⁰ op. cit., Arendt H. (2006), p. 108.

of a *propositional attitude* that can be described such as B_ap . In this case, a stands for ‘O’Brien’ and B for ‘believe’; then we can read B_ap as ‘ a believes p [preposition: *Everything that is held by the Party is truth*]’, since ‘if he believed p , he would also believe all the consequences of p .’³¹

(ii) He has showed that he would totally commit himself to the Party and blindly obey what the Party demands, since the Party is God, who holds every truth; God is power, and O’Brien, a selfless priest of God (III, iii, 239: 8).

IV. Becoming inhuman – semantic analyses of Winston’s soliloquy

For the Party, ‘the way to deal with opponents was “rectification of thought,” an elaborate procedure of constant molding and remolding of the minds.’³² Winston was no exception, either. He was constantly subjected to the indoctrination programme conducted by O’Brien, the Party incarnate, and so badly cast down through the succession of mental and physical tortures that his personality completely disintegrated. The totalitarian system slowly but steadily got inside Winston (cf. III, vi, 262: 16-17). Above all, through his betrayal of Julia, whom he loved (III, vi, 259: 8-10, 263: 33-34), he gradually loses what is left of his humanity. His deep sense of loss further accelerates the disintegration of his personality (III, vi, 268-269: 24-38). He eventually grumbles to himself:

‘I think I exist,’ he said wearily. ‘I am conscious of my own identity. I was born, and I shall die. I have arms and legs. I occupy a particular point in space. No other solid object can occupy the same point simultaneously. In that sense, does Big Brother exist?’ ‘It is of no importance. He exists.’ (III, ii, 235: 12-16)

IV-1. *I think I exist.*

I think I exist (III, ii, 235, 12) reminds us of Descartes who, as his philosophical formula *Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I exist.) shows,³³ established his whole philosophical idea on ‘an *immediatum* of conscious experience’³⁴ and of G. E. Moore who tried to prove the existence of the external world outside our consciousness.

It is quite evident that Descartes tried to prove his existence by means of the following syllogism:

- (1) I think I exist;
- (2) I think;
- (3) Therefore, I exist.

This is a typical example of *circular reasoning*, since *I think* presupposes *I exist*, which is objectively certain and does not require any proof from me. To state a common-sense proposition *I think, therefore I exist*, so that I prove my own existence, is utterly without meaning.

How about Moore? In his article, *Proof of an External World*, he argues:

I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And, if by doing this, I have proved *ipso facto* the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples.³⁵

His argument, at first glance, seems to be very ambitious but full of peculiarities. Since the existence of something, say x (*Two human hands exist.*), is objectively certain, it is utterly unnecessary to prove that x exists. Doubting x exists is itself nonsense.

This shows that in our ordinary life, to state *I think I exist* is full of peculiarities; since *I exist* is objectively certain and unless we are dragged into an unexpected human condition in which doubting makes sense, stating *I think I exist* is utterly nonsense.³⁶ Sentences such as *I think I have a pain in my chest* in the form of the first-person singular also belong to the same class.

Other parts of Winston’s soliloquy (III, ii, 12-15),

I am conscious of my own identity. I was born, and I shall die. I have arms and legs. I occupy a particular point in space. No other solid object can occupy the same point simultaneously.

also can be considered as common-sense prepositions about which we cannot doubt, and doubting them makes no sense in ordinary human life: they are, in the words of Wittgenstein, ‘the inherited background against which

³¹ Allwood, Anderson and Dahl. (1997) *Logic in Linguistics*. Cambridge University Press, p. 113-115. I owe this to Jaakko Hintikka’s idea in the system of epistemic logical formulation.

³² op. cit., Arendt. H. (1985), preface to part III, xxvi.

³³ op. cit., Descartes R. *Discourse on the Method*. IV, 28-49.

³⁴ Kenny A. (1968) *Descartes*. Random House: New York, p. 41.

³⁵ G. E. Moore (1959) *Philosophical Papers*. London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 145-146.

³⁶ Malcom N. (1989) *Wittgenstein: Nothing is Hidden*. Oxford: Blackwell. In the word of Merton, ‘*Cogito ergo sum* is the declaration of an alienated being, in exile from his own spiritual depth, compelled to seek some comfort in proof for his own existence (!) based on the observation that he “thinks”’ [Merton M. (1972) *New Seeds of Contemplation*. Penguin Books: New York, p. 8].

[we]³⁷ can distinguish between true and false (...*es ist überkommene Hintergrund, auf welchem [ich] zwischen wahr und falsch untersheide.*)'.³⁸ Doubting them is therefore nonsense and it is what simply leads to insanity; nevertheless this happened to Winston.³⁹

V. Conclusion

Linguistic approach to *Nineteen Eighty-Four* clearly reveals that *nonsense*, on which no one can establish his or her own existence as a human being is deeply nested in the core of the totalitarian system (though it is described in a quite old-fashioned political style when compared with today's powerful Internet system 'that promises social control on a [massive] scale'⁴⁰). Herein, lies the very source that makes us inhuman and the very reason why the word (language) may lose its *humane meaning*. In that sense, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* works as a powerful metaphor for social and political conditions we may face in our actual life.

³⁷ Here, I have changed the wording of the first-person-singular pronoun *Ich* (I) in the original German text into *we*.

³⁸ Wittgenstein L. (1969) *On Certainty*. New York and Evanston: J. & J. Harper Editions. n. 94.

³⁹ Someone may think that semantic analyses of his soliloquy in relation to pragmatics, particularly focused on *illocutionary acts* in *I think I exist*, seems to be quite constructive in revealing his state of mind. In the context of part III, ii, 235, 12, it is quite natural to assume that in saying *I think I exist*, Winston (a) simply seemed to express the state of his mind such as his *anxiety* and *fear*, or (b) tried to calm/ dispel his anxiety and fears. This, however, would not be the case that Winston faced.

⁴⁰ Foreword by Thomas Pynchon for Centennial Edition of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. New York: A Plume, Harcourt Brace, 2003, xvi, modified.

Table 1. The A Vocabulary: Words needed for the business of everyday life

Parts of Speech	Construction	Example			Notes
Verb-Noun (V-N)	V-N	think, knife			<i>Knife</i> (N/V) Caesar was <i>knifed</i> (stabbed in OS) to death.
Adjective (Adj)	(V-N) + -ful, -er, est	Positive	Comparative	Superlative	Some adjectives, such as <i>strong</i> , <i>big</i> , <i>good</i> , <i>black</i> , <i>soft</i> in Oldspeak, were retained.
		thinkful, goodthinkful (B)	plusthinkful	doubleplusthinkful	
		speedful	plusspeedful	doubleplusspeedful	
		cold (retained OS)	pluscold	doublepluscold	
		good (retained OS)	gooder	goodest	
Adverb (Adv)	(V-N) + -wise	goodwise, speedwise, goodthinkwise (B)			
Auxiliary Verb (Aux. V)	will, would				<i>Shall</i> and <i>should</i> tenses were dropped.
Verb (V)	-ed	Infinitive	Past tense (-ed)		No Irregular verbs
		steal, think	stealed, thinked		
Affix (prefix)	un-, plus, doubleplus- + Adj	uncold, ungood, unlight, undark			
Affix (suffix)	-ful	thinkful, speedful			
Numbers: plural	-s, -es	mans, oxes, lifes			

Table 2. The B Vocabulary: Words constructed for political purposes

Parts of Speech	Construction	Example	Meaning (N)	Meaning (V)	Past tense/ Past Participle	Present Participle	Adj
Noun-Verb (N-V)	1. compound words 2. free word-order 3. two or three syllables	goodthink	orthodoxy	to think in an orthodox manner	goodthanked	goodthinking	
		goodthinker	orthodox thinker				
		crimthink	thought crime	to commit a thought crime			
		thinkpol	thought police				
		Minitrue					Minitruthful
		Minipax					Minipeaceful
		Miniluv					Minilovely
		joycamp	Forced-labour camp in <i>doublethink</i>				
The C Vocabulary		Minipax	Ministry of war				
		A supplementary to the others and consisting of entirely scientific and technical terms (279:8-9; 276:20-21). The usual care was taken to define them rigidly and strip them of undesirable meanings. They followed the same grammatical rules as the words in the other two vocabularies (279: 11-13).					
Words, such as <i>free, honor, justice, morality, internationalism, democracy, science and religion</i> no longer exist.							